Music: An Aesthetic and Cognitive Approach

Written by Anna S. Caruso

Music can be considered a great many things; an art, an emotional or personal expression, an understanding of a deeper human truth. From the perspective of Nelson Goodman, music is symbolic and a part of an aesthetic experience. Furthermore, Goodman proports aesthetics as a type of cognition. He argues that artistic forms, such as music, should not be considered separate from other forms of knowing (e.g., science) (Giovannelli, 2017). Art should be considered a way to understand the world and is done so through the artistic merit of each work; aka aesthetics. In this way, Goodman has attempted to erase the boundaries between art, science, and experience. Rather, they are all ways gaining knowledge and insight into the world. This ideology is encapsulated by aesthetic cognitivism, where aesthetic engagement leads to knowledge, or a deeper comprehension (Christensen et al., 2023). Goodman was not the first to believe in and provide philosophical support for the cognitive value of art, with philosophers such as Nussbaum, Walsh, Beardman, and even so far back as Aristotle, each considering different artistic and aesthetic forms as vehicles for deeper understanding of the world (Gaut, 2005).

 While this ideology encompasses multiple artistic forms, we can focus specifically on the aesthetic cognitivism of the musical form. As an aesthetic form, music allows us to deepen our understanding of various aspects of human nature, such as emotion, identity, and expression. Music holds aesthetic value through its ability to hold semantic density, syntactic density, repletedness, exemplification, and complex references (Bowman, 1998). Goodman agrees with the notion of music as a symbol, albeit a referential one, seen through individualistic perception. Though, I would argue, also through a cultural and temporal perception.

One strength of Goodman’s theory involves the understanding of a subjective truth, that our individualistic understandings of reality are seen through the influences of our biases, past experiences, and perception. Further, our perceptions of events are imperfect. But it is through these different perceptual inputs (sight, smell, sound, touch, etc.,) we craft our understanding of reality. Music is one such symbol, which allows us to view the refraction of reality we can perceive through its ability to hold the components of aesthetics (i.e., expression, semantic density, referential or insightful ability etc.). It is in part through this crafting that music holds cognitive as well as an aesthetic value.

Critics of this theory may argue aesthetic cognitivism erases the value of specific pieces, or deems a work with no cognitive value as worthless (Bowman, 1998). However, this presents a false dichotomy, and is not what proponents of aesthetic cognitivism (such as Goodman) argue. It is not enough to judge a work as either of cognitive value or worthless. Rather, one could think of aesthetic cognitivism as a spectrum, with any work of music providing some level of aesthetic engagement (dependent on musical, extra-musical, and individualistic factors), upon which such engagement music allows for understanding and knowledge. To argue music as cognitive value through those two components of understanding and knowledge, each must have an operational definition. When these outcomes of musical aesthetic engagement are discussed, rarely do I believe they are referring to knowledge or understanding as if music were a pedagogical approach to facts or a way to increase cognitive skills like critical thinking or attention. Rather, the cognitive applications of musical or aesthetic engagement are ones of emotional recognition and expression, feelings of purpose and belonging, and as a source of personal meaning (Groarke & Hogan, 2015; Greasley & Lamont, 2011). Cognition itself is a synonym for understanding. This idea of understanding can also be considered to be an understanding of the personal experiences of the composer, singer, or musician who have written or performed a musical work. From that standpoint, and through Goodman’s notion of music as an art form requiring performance (Giovannelli 2017), every work of music holds some cognitive value through the understanding of an interpretation and the insight into a personal expression if nothing else. Thus, no work of music is inherently without the potential for aesthetic engagement, which is how the cognitive outcomes of music listening and music making occurs.

Goodman’s theory of music as an aesthetic cognitive value is not one without flaws, but neither is it without merit. Through both philosophical argumentation and a growing movement in an empirical understanding of aesthetic engagement and aesthetic emotions (i.e., Christensen et al, 2023, Brinck, 2018; Greasley & Lamont, 2011) Goodman’s belief in the aesthetic form of music as having cognitive value, is supported.

References

Bowman, W. D. (1998). Philosophical perspectives of music. Oxford University Press

Brinck, I. (2018). Empathy, engagement, entrainment: The interaction dynamics of aesthetic experience. Cognitive processing, 19(2), 201-213.

Christensen, A. P., Cardillo, E. R., & Chatterjee, A. (2023). Can art promote understanding? A review of the psychology and neuroscience of aesthetic cognitivism. Psychology of Aesthetics, Creativity, and the Arts.

Gaut, B. (2005). Art and knowledge. In J. Levinson (Ed), The Oxford handbook of aesthetics (pp. 436–450). Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199279456.003.0025

Giovannelli, A. (2017) “Goodman’s Aesthetics”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2017/entries/goodman-aesthetics/&gt;.

Greasley, A. E., & Lamont, A. (2011). Exploring engagement with music in everyday life using experience sampling methodology. Musicae Scientiae, 15(1), 45–71. https://doi.org/10.1177/1029864910393417

Groarke, J. M., & Hogan, M. J. (2015). Enhancing well-being: An emerging model of the adaptive functions of music listening. Psychology of Music, 44(4), 769–791. https://doi.org/10.1177/0305735615591844

Nelson Goodman: Denoting

Written by Melanie Cruse and Sean Cator

Goodman states that aesthetic experience is created through cognitive activity, and it encompasses all areas of art, not just music. The philosophy that music is a symbol is shared by both Goodman and fellow philosopher, Susanne Langer. Goodman, however, clarifies some issues that he believes are problematic in Langer’s theory. He offers a specific solution, which explains how symbols refer, and how this process operates, making the case for symbolism as more conceptual. Another aspect of Goodman’s philosophy, which differs from Langer’s is the idea of resemblance. “According to Langer, symbolic activity is possible because of recognizable formal congruence between a symbol and what it symbolizes” (Bowman, 1998, 206). For there to be any symbolic relevance, Langer believes resemblance must occur, and this is limiting to a person’s symbolic experience. Goodman disagrees with this concept, as many things can resemble, but do not necessarily represent anything. “If resemblance was essential to representation, people would encounter difficulty distinguishing the represented from the representation” (Bowman 1998, 226). 

Reference is at the core of Goodman’s theory. He believes that symbols need a reference to be classified as symbolic. Langer’s theory does not offer a way for symbols to refer, and that is why it receives criticism. Goodman believes that there is no previously constructed reality that we are trying to obtain. Rather, symbols can be used to create each person’s own reality. “There is no way the world ultimately ‘is’, argues Goodman, only various and diverse ways it may be found” (Bowman 1998, 225). Our perception and conception of symbols around us will help us find our reality. Music, language, and pictures are means to create worlds by having the ability to represent, organize, and classify. 

Denoting and exemplifying are two modes of reference that Goodman explains in his theory. Denoting stands for something that can be used to classify and characterize.  A primary difference between denotation and exemplification is the direction of the reference.  “In denotation a label is being applied to something; in exemplification there is something to which a label applies. If a exemplifies b. then (1) a possesses or is denoted by b and (2) a refers to b. a is a concrete object functioning as a symbol. b, strictly speaking, is a label” (Jensen 1973, 47). A visual example of this can be a picture of Santa Claus on a card. We do not need to compare Santa Claus to anything else; we know it is Santa Claus based on the features we know about Santa Claus (Elgin, 2001, p. 689). 

A musical example would be staccato. If we were listening to a piece of music that utilizes a staccato articulation, we would hear short, separated notes. We do not need to compare it with anything else to know that it is staccato. By definition, denoting can be applied through classification and characterization.  For example, let’s consider staccato articulation. We can listen to an example of staccato playing and classify it as a performance style, which is characterized by playing a series of notes in a short, separated manner. Another example would be in musical form. Forms characterize the order in which sections or themes within a piece are heard. A piece of music where there is an initial statement of a theme and reinstatements are separated by contrasting material would be denoted as Rondo form.  In choral music, text would denote movements within a setting of a Mass. These refer to the different parts such as the Kyrie, Credo, Sanctus, etc. 

Goodman provides an intuitive philosophy to show how music is symbolic. Through the processes of denoting and exemplifying, reference is achieved and therefore can be classified as symbols. These symbols help create a reality for each individual and provides a better understanding of the world around us.  

References

Bowman, Wayne D. Philosophical Perspectives on Music. New York: Oxford University Press, 1998.

Elgin, Catherine Z. “The Legacy of Nelson Goodman.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62, no. 3 (2001): 679–90. https://doi.org/10.2307/2653547.

Jensen, Henning. “Exemplification in Nelson Goodman’s Aesthetic Theory.” The Journal of aesthetics and art criticism 32, no. 1 (1973): 47–51.

Aesthetic Value as Cognitive Value

Written by Scot R. Ward

In any discussion of Goodman, I think it is invaluable to first identify that his work in this space is specifically following the philosophy of Langer. When discussing Aesthetic Value as Cognitive Value, Goodman falls in complete opposition to Langer’s take that music serves as a symbol, which reveals some other reality. Goodman doesn’t subscribe to the notion that music provides an aesthetic experience, a common discussion among Enlightenment thinkers.  Goodman believes that emotional reactions to music exist as a cognitive function, not a communicated aesthetic experience, or as they call them “symptoms.” These are Goodman’s five symptoms of the aesthetic:

Syntactical density – arrangement of symbols is frequent

Semantic density – how a symbol is condensed and interrelated within awork

Repleteness – features of a symbol are provided in abundance

Exemplification – examples of a symbol are provided

Multiple and complex reference – symbol performs integrated and interacting referential functions

Essentially, this is a breakdown of the ways cognitive discernment occurs in what is called by many to be an aesthetic experience. So then, what’s the point of engaging with music, if not to experience and appreciate beauty? To Goodman, music engagement is simply one manner in which intellectual curiosity is stimulated. He urges the rejection of the “myth of the insularity of aesthetic experience” (Bowman, 1998, p. 234).

As a young performer, armed with my seminar discussions of aesthetics and the concept of the sublime, I was enraptured by a romantic perspective on my calling to communicate the art of music.  I spent one long evening filled with liquid courage in an argument I was having with a fellow artist who was a potter. He insisted that all creation of art is in fact craft, that art may only exist as perceived by an audience. This conversation was a tremendous (and frustrating) awakening.  After hours of arguing, I realized that I agreed.

Today, I realize that at that moment I was forming a similar outlook to that of Goodman.  I steered away from the view of performer as communicator and towards listener as interpreter.  This is a simple example of my first encounter with this philosophy, or perhaps it was the first time I was willing to listen. 

Reference

Bowman, W. D. (1998). Philosophical perspectives of music. Oxford.

Goodman: Music and World Making

Written by Avery Bouffard, Jacquelyn Krueger, and Carson Kirchner

Goodman believed musical meaning is symbolic and is represented two symbolic modes: denotation and exemplification. Both of these symbolic modes center around labeling and characterizing. According to Goodman, “human ‘reality’ is a human construction” (Bowman, p. 224), meaning that each person develops their own reality based off of how they understand the world around them.  For Goodman, “symbols create various worlds or ‘realities’ by acting as lenses that emphasize certain features while they blur or neglect others” (Bowman, p. 225). Furthermore, symbols help us to describe, label, characterize, and interpret our realities.

There are many different types of symbols. The process of referencing these symbols is vastly complex and involves a nuanced system of modes. This system is important in the process of creating one’s reality. Symbols are used to mediate perception, therefore shaping people’s realities. As people interpret symbols, their own perception begins to form. For example, when someone describes something, they form their reality by labeling it, and therefore characterizing it in their own particular way. Goodman uses the human eye as an example as it sees with both need and prejudice. The same is true for the denotation of reality. For this reason, a neutral perception of reality is not possible.

Exemplification is symbolic and is reliant on (and characterized by) reference and possession. Within exemplification, symbols must possess a reference point. Reference is the main principle and function behind what symbols are able to exemplify. However, possession remains vital, as a symbol must contain a certain feature in order to provide a reference. Symbols which exemplify provide examples or demonstrate the features or qualities of which they possess. Within exemplification, symbols both show and refer simultaneously. The main question within the exemplification mode concerning symbols is, what labels are able to be applied to each symbol?

According to Goodman, expression is a part of the “symbolic-referential mode of exemplification” (Bowman, p. 227). Goodman does not consider expression to be an emotional experience, but rather a specific means of reference, which can be understood through symbolic analysis. Therefore, musical expression also contains, and is reliant on, reference and possession. However, music does not possess the features it is expressing literally, but rather metaphorically.

When speaking about metaphors, it is important to make the distinction that metaphorical possession is just as real as literal possession. It is simply a transfer of the label from one realm to another. Goodman claims metaphors can only be considered successful if they contain conflict as well as the possibility of a resolution. When applied to music and musical passages, Bowman uses the expression of joy as an example. Bowman explains that if a musical passage were to express and evoke joyful properties, “then ‘joy’ is both referred to by and metaphorically denotes the music in question” (Bowman, p. 229) According to Goodman, metaphorical possession can only be considered expression when exemplification (referencing) is occurring.

Reference

Bowman, W. D. (1998).  Philosophical perspectives of music.  New York, NY:  Oxford University Press.

Goodman: Aesthetic Value as Cognitive Value and Cognitive Versus Aesthetic Value

Written by Dan Hill and David Reynolds

Bowman attempts to describe Goodman’s philosophy of the cognitive and aesthetic value of music. According to Goodman, music’s symbolic value lies in its cognitive value, and there is no reason for the aesthetic realm to enter in to the equation when discussing the semiotic value of music. He goes on to state that “[W]hat compels is the urge to know, what delights is discovery …. The primary purpose is cognition in and for itself” (p. 233). He argues that music is like any other symbolic activity, which is pursued purely for intellectual curiosity, and therefore doesn’t fit within his definition of the aesthetic.

Goodman’s stance on cognitive versus aesthetic value, however, seems to be at odds with his own philosophy of music as symbol, and many of his arguments are weakened or disproven by Monroe Beardsley. Goodman claims “music, like all symbolic experience, is a way of world making” (Bowman, p. 234), and he argues that through symbols, each individual constructs his or her own reality. If Goodman believes that “‘reality’ is what we construct with musical (and other) symbols” (p. 252), and believes the primary purpose is for cognition, then shouldn’t one be able to construct a reality in which music is pursued for the aesthetic experience, and it is the aesthetic that drives the cognition? When thinking of why someone chooses to pursue music, the reasons can be many. Perhaps, they are interested to learn more, or they enjoy the experience of listening to music and want to be a part of its creation. Maybe it is simply a requirement from a parental unit. Regardless, the mere existence of multiple reasons for pursuing a musical path contradicts Goodman’s rejection of the aesthetic value in music.

Goodman works hard to separate music from feeling by disproving the aesthetic experience. He claims it is merely a byproduct of cognitive activity with five symptoms: (a) syntactical density, (b) semantic density, (c) repleteness, (d) exemplification, and (e) multiple/complex reference (p. 233).  He describes each symptom as a cognitive function, and when combined, they demand so many “discriminations and cognitive adjustments” that the aesthetic experience feels like a mystery, when it is really just density of information.

His belief that each person constructs his or her own reality through symbols is very accessible.  Each individual has subtly nuanced definitions of words in his or her own mind. When interpreting symbols, we all base our interpretations on our prior experiences and knowledge, etc.  It makes sense then, that each of us would interpret those symbols slightly (or incredibly) differently and the reality we find ourselves in as a result of those interpretations would be different than anyone else.  It is confusing that he argued so strongly, and with a great deal of validity against Langer’s assertion that there is one way the universe is, to just turn around and state that there is one way that aesthetics is, and that music’s value lies only in its cognitive merits.  He even goes as far as to compare aesthetic experiences in music to diseases with or without symptoms, and says “No doubt aesthetic emotions have the property that makes the aesthetic…the theory of aesthetic phlogiston explains everything and nothing.” (p. 232).

In listing and describing the cognitive functions of his five symptoms of the aesthetic, Goodman basically erases the line between cognition and feeling.  Goodman also claims there is no need to evaluate music, which also contradicts his own argument about music and symbol. How is an individual able to construct their own reality without interpreting and valuing symbols in their own way?  If all art is equal in value then why is it necessary for symbols to be interpreted individually? It appears that in both of these cases his own quote about theory explaining everything and nothing applies very well.

In contrast, Beardsley presents five symptoms of the aesthetic character: (a) object-directedness, (b) sense of felt freedom, (c) sense of detached affect, (d) sense of active discovery, and (e) sense of wholeness.  By offering these symptoms Beardsley does not discount the value of cognition in the musical experience, but he does present an accessible way for individuals to understand that music is more than just cognition. Goodman’s claim that music serves purely a cognitive purpose is at odds with his symbolistic view of music, and by arguing against music’s aesthetic value, he is weakening his own stance on the value of music as symbol.

Reference

Bowman, W. D. (1998).  Philosophical perspectives of music.  New York, NY:  Oxford University Press.

Goodman and Music Notation Systems

Written by Michael Walker

When referring to musical notation systems, Goodman’s discourse on symbolism indicates the digital system is the most accurate (Bowman, 1998). This characterization of pitch accuracy is well suited to the absoluteness of Western music notation, which can be extremely precise in pitch representation. As he states, a middle-C is a middle-C, and any other note played is simply wrong. Therefore, I believe Goodman’s digital application is valid.  Additionally, Bowman’s presentation of Goodman’s thoughts on rhythmic notation follows similar logic in that a digital system has no room for variance.  This too is directly related to the semantic requirements. The first of which is for the symbol to be clear and precise.

However, Bowman does point out that a system which conforms to all conditions is extremely infrequent. When pertaining to the performance of the pitch, Goodman seems to leave out a very significant attribute of the pitch, which is the character (i.e., quality) of the pitch.  The quality of a note is not precisely the same for every performer.  For example, when musicians play middle-C, different musical instruments produce different timbres.  Furthermore, serious musicians take significant time and effort to develop their individual sound.  This variance can enhance the totality of a group’s sound, and the sound character can dramatically affect the expressive nature of the music represented by the notation.

As for finitely differentiated rhythmic notation, while strict interpretation is accurate to a degree, I wonder what Goodman would say about the interpretation of swing eighth notes in 4/4 time.  Not only is the interpretation of two eighth notes inexact (i.e., not interpreted as strict divisions of the written notation), the interpretation is not always consistent from performance to performance or from group to group.  The long-eighth short-eighth interpretation of two eighth notes in swing music can be perceived as more analog than digital.  In other words, there is a great degree of differentiation in the interpretation of two eighth notes.

In conclusion, performers create their own world of pitches, so to speak, and their sound is created more precisely than simply pressing a key (button) or placing a fingering.  Additionally, vibrato (pitch variance) can be introduced; all as part of the one very specific pitch indicated on the staff.  Include in this the analog concept of swing eighth notes, and the overall concept of the digital systems can be brought in question as it pertains to staff notation – especially at a high-performance level.

References

Bowman, W. D. (1998). Philosophical perspectives on music. New York, NY:  Oxford University Press.